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Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in 
rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes. 
The purpose of this short note, an addendum to “A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,”
 1 is to 
describe an auction mechanism suitable for injections of capital into banks. The auctions would 
price the equity purchases through a competitive process. The elements of such a mechanism are 
as follows: 
•  For any participating bank, securities would be defined that meet the legislation’s criteria. 
These might, for example, be: shares that are nonvoting for the initial five years (but are 
otherwise identical to the existing common stock); shares of preferred stock; warrants on 
common stock or preferred stock; or senior debt instruments. 
•  A specified percentage of x% of each security would be sold to the government, and the 
balance would be sold to private investors. (An illustrative value for x is 50%.) 
•  The offering of the securities to private investors would be conducted by a uniform-price 
(sealed-bid or dynamic) auction. The government and private investors would receive 
identical securities and would pay identical prices. 
Conceptually, the auction could operate in either of two ways: 
•  A fixed number of shares of each given security is specified, and the auction determines 
a price for these securities. 
•  A fixed amount of money is allocated by the Treasury for each security, and the auction 
determines the quantity of shares that will be purchased. Note that, in the event that 
private investors cannot be found to invest the specified private sector match of funds, 
then the amount allocated for the security would be reduced or the offering withdrawn. 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 expresses a preference for utilizing 
market mechanisms: “In making purchases under this Act, the Secretary shall (1) make such 
purchases at the lowest price that the Secretary determines to be consistent with the purposes of 
this Act; and (2) maximize the efficiency of the use of taxpayer resources by using market 
mechanisms, including auctions or reverse auctions, where appropriate.”
 2 The Act also expresses 
a preference for private sector participation: “The Secretary shall encourage the private sector to 
participate in purchases of troubled assets, and to invest in financial institutions, consistent with 
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the provisions of this section.”
 3 There are good reasons for each of these preferences. First, use 
of market mechanisms should help to assure that taxpayers pay a fair price for any bank shares. 
Second, a transparent rules-based process will minimize favoritism and corruption. And, third, 
private sector participation will both leverage the government’s efforts and provide independent 
monitoring of the process. 
Although auctions for securities of different banks could be conducted in sequence, there are 
good reasons to consider conducting them in simultaneous dynamic auctions—in this case, these 
are simultaneous ascending auctions, since multiple private investors are competing to buy the 
securities of each bank. From a private investor’s perspective, the securities of different banks 
are related in two important respects. First, their valuations are based in part on common 
systemic factors, such as the prospects for the subprime MBS market. Second, each private 
investor has only a limited amount of capital (or risk tolerance) for investing in banks requiring 
capital injections, and simultaneous dynamic auctions would enable investors to balance their 
capital commitments to different banks. The ability to adjust commitments during the auction 
encourages efficient price formation and reduces investor risk. Simultaneous auctions might also 
enable the Treasury to better manage its capital injections among the different banks. 
Comparison with related proposals for injecting bank capital 
Over the past several weeks, a wide variety of economists, including Charles Calomiris, 
James Galbraith, Glenn Hubbard, Paul Krugman, Edmund Phelps and Joseph Stiglitz, have been 
quoted in favor of recapitalizing banks by purchasing their securities. The implicit assumption 
generally has been that the purchases would be based on the market price of the bank stock on 
the public exchanges. However, there are several difficulties in this. First, using the market price 
during a specified time period would present opportunities for banks to manipulate the price. If, 
instead, investors were required to inject their own new capital at the same price, the 
opportunities for manipulation would be reduced. Second, the securities received by the Treasury 
would be different from those publicly traded. In particular, the Treasury’s securities would not 
be voted, and they would reflect the post-dilution (not pre-dilution) value of the securities. 
Selling identical securities to the public and private sectors would resolve this issue. Third, it is 
clearly desirable to leverage the Treasury’s limited resources with private resources—and the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 clearly encourages this. 
Recently, Greg Mankiw proposed “The government can stand ready to be a silent partner to 
future Warren Buffetts. It could work as follows. Whenever any financial institution attracts new 
private capital in an arms-length transaction, it can access an equal amount of public capital. The 
taxpayer would get the same terms as the private investor. The only difference is that 
government’s shares would be nonvoting until the government sold the shares at a later date.”
 4 
This is closely related to our auction recommendation, but the auction has several advantages. 
First, in our proposal, the taxpayer gets the exact same terms as the private investor. (By contrast, 
a typical private deal is accompanied by other explicit or implicit exchanges of value, including 
but not limited to voting shares and board seats, that would be unavailable to the government.) 
Second, use of an auction would help to assure that the private transaction is truly arms-length. 
Third, we describe an explicit market mechanism that would be straightforward to implement. 
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